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SEE Journal this is the concept that current generations hold the environment as natural capital in common with future generations. Therefore, present generations need not reduce the ability of future ones to meet heir needs. Hence, we introduce in this paper a mechanism which shows that young generations will be in charge of selling pollution permits to firms.
As outlined by Schelling (1995) using the Infinite Life Agent (ILA) model with environmental problems involves a fallacy of composition in intergenerational fairness. Therefore, abatement policies should be seen in the context of decisions involving intergenerational redistribution. Moreover, as underlined by Gerlagh et al. (2000) , although a dynastic framework might be convenient for economic analysis, it is restrictive and can be misleading. On the other hand, OLG models are more flexible and may give results different from those derived from dynastic models.
In order to capture the long-term macroeconomic impacts of implementing TEP into an economy, OLG models seem to be more appropriate. The use of this aforementioned framework initially developped by Diamond (1965) is spreading in the literature, especially in environmental economics (John et al. (1994) , Ono (1996) , Stockey (1998) , Grimaud (1999) , Gerlagh et al. (2001) , Ono (2002) , Jouvet et al. (2002) , Lambrecht (2005) , Jouvet et al. (2006) ).
In Jouvet et al. (2006) pollution is regulated by a system of tradable emission permits under political constraints. Jouvet et al. (2002) consider the question of the tradable emission permits variations' effects on longterm capital accumulation. Ono (1996) and John et al. (1994) implement environmental policies by applying financial controls on polluting activities. Ono (2002) , Grimaud (1999) and Stockey (1998) introduce pollution permits in order to obtain an optimum allocation of capital and environmental protection. However they do not consider the effects in the variation in the number of permits, or on environmental quality. Gerlagh et al. (2000) show through an Integrated Assessment Model mainly that GHG abatement efficiency could be indirectly influenced by institutional decisions (interest rate) set to face a demographic change scenario. A rule of initial allocation of property rights (grandfathering) is designed for environmental protection. Lambrecht (2005) , like Ono (2002) , believes that the initial allocation of tradable emission permits would be through sales to companies. Lambrecht (2005) shows how the introduction of a permit system could generate capital accumulation compared to a 'laissez-faire' equilibrium. Both previous authors offer an environmental protection policy based on investment in the operation of environmental maintenance financed by young generations.
Following Beltrati (1996) and Jouvet et al. (2002) we assume that Pollution Permits can be used as investments or financial assets which need to be financed to achieve an equilibrium. We also assume that when an environmental policy is set by the Public Authority, property rights are defined on the environment and ownership is given to young generations, yet within our ideas of green fiscal policy and the use of this levy-fund.
Whilst our approach is closer to these papers from Lambrecht (2005) , Ono (2002) , Jouvet et al. (2002) , Jouvet et al. (2006) , nevertheless we differ by coupling a green fiscal system and Pollution Permits. The source of financing in terms of our taxation system is different from those of previous authors. In our approach, as did these previous authors, we deal with the question of environmental maintenance.
However, we differ from them on one hand by treating the investment/financial asset (tradable emission permits) as a source of income; this justifies the implementation of our fiscal policy on this income. On the other hand, we depart from the use of this fund (finance environmental debt and adaptation funding, equity -solidarity and intergenerational issues). Even though we assume GHG reduction policy aims as in Gerlagh et al. (2000) with allocation of property rights in our approach, property rights through Pollution Permits are not initially assigned for free to young generations and we do not regard ageing aspects. As a result, we do not consider the grandfathering allocation rule in this paper.
This paper is organized as follows. The Business as Usual frame is presented in section 2. The environment quality modelling here shows that to reduce GHG emissions, environmental policies are necessary. The two following sections characterize the OLG model with green policies with intertemporal capital equilibrium, and the study of theoretical property and implication of TEP allocation is defined here; to our knowledge, the concept of allowing property rights on the environment coupled with a green fiscal policy has not yet been broached within the framework of overlapping generations models. The last section concludes the paper. [1]
Intertemporal Optimization
The optimization problem under constraints within the OLG framework is resolved through the construction of the Intertemporal Budgetary Constraints (IBC) relation. In this first part we have specified a logarithmic utility function.
[2] ( )
, , log log
represents an index of environmental quality; is the time preference rate.
The closer this index approaches its maximum value, the better the environmental quality will be, and consumption will not be affected. Inversely, as we move away from this maximum value due to harmfulness, the negative impact on the agent's utility for each period of life will be greater.
The aforementioned IBC is:
[3]
Where:
• : Transfer or Pension received from government revenue in the second part of the life cycle (retirement) ; • .
• : Interest rate between the period and , on the capital market ;
Optimal Consumption
Writing the following expression as being the 'Discounted Life Cycle Income' (named RCV): This is achieved by equalizing the marginal productivity of the factors employed in the production process at their real cost. The capital is not entirely depreciated and we assume no adjustment cost of capital.
Relative Prices
Given decision variables :
[14]
With :
7 Even though consumption is at the origin of pollution, we assume here that emissions are linked only to production. 
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• : the rate of capital in production;
From the optimality conditions, we obtain the relative prices:
[15]
Investment
Capital accumulation is characterized by this relation:
[17]
Government
Budget and Public Expenditures
Public expenditures and retirement income are funded by taxes applied on all the revenues at rate ( ).
During the present period t, the equation of public expenditure is hence:
The Public Authority budget is used to finance public goods and pension plans.
Retirement Funds Held by the State
The retirement budget used to finance transfers to the older generation comes from taxes on the young generation's gross wage.
[4]
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The Quality of the Environment
We assume that production is at the origin of the pollution concentration in the atmosphere. At each moment, this concentration ( ) 
In Any Steady State
In the presence of GHG, we obtain the steady state environment quality, from [5] The observation in this proposition leads to the fact that it could be necessary for the Public Authority to 8 Actual policy for interest rates and levels of taxes introduced and applied on the households' income.
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SEE Journal contemplate environmental policies in order to set down GHG abatement policies. 
Defining the BAU Equilibrium
Overlapping Generations Model with Environmental Policy 9
Overview
As mentioned above, GHG emissions come from firms' production activities, and decrease households' welfare. These GHG are also harmful to environmental quality through their negative impacts. The environment is considered a public good. We assume in this second part that firms have the same technology, and that the fossil fuel used in the production process is the main source of GHG. .
Instrument of Environmental Policy
The Public Authority is a member of a Supranational Committee 10 and has decided on the adoption of binding agreements through quantitative emissions targets. Therefore, a tradable emission permits system is implemented in the economy as an international mobilization (H 5 ). 9 The variables and parameters of this 2 nd part are assumed to be indexed on , , 
Initial Allocation of Pollution Permits
Here, property rights are defined in terms of the environment. Indeed, under temporal flexibility, we assume that these private rights are owned and purchased from the Public Authority at price only by young households; these property rights are resold at a profit on a tradable emission permits market (H 6 ) to firms which cannot use the flexibility of the system; this means that they are unable to invest in clean-production technology and reduce their GHG emissions as depicted in graph 1, below. Moreover, at each period, the property rights generate an amount of income ( )
These assumptions are quite close to John et al. (1994) , John et al. (1995) , and Ono (2002) within the framework of an overlapping generations model in the case of environmental externalities. In their approach, they assume the existence of a Public Authority which represents young households and operates an environmental maintenance policy to their advantage. The amount of property rights at the beginning of the period is equal to exogenous emission targets (H 7 ) initially set by the Supranational Committee during agreement negotiations. (H 8 ). The use of tradable permits in the production process can be helpful to set a control on GHG emissions, and to reduce firms' clean technological adaptation costs through the real demand of permits.
Further Assumptions and Propositions
For each period the production function is represented by:
This equation may also be written as:
[10] The problem of the representative firm consists in maximizing its new profit function below:
New Relative Prices
From this equation [13] , the relative prices are: [14] ( ) 
Investment Equation
Capital accumulation is the same as seen in equation [17] 
Dynamics of GHG Emissions and Pollution Accumulation Taken into Account
At each period t firms in a competitive market are allowed to emit as much pollution as they have has acquired the rights to emit, or by owning it on the tradable emissions market where households are sellers. Pollution is generated by the use of emissions permits in the firms' activities, and has negative impacts on environmental quality. Hence there is a negative correlation between Pollution Permits and the quality of the environment. As found in Jouvet et al. (2002) , 'pollution stock at a particular time t depends on the stock of pollution of the preceding period -and of the demand of tradable emission permits revealed by firms during the current period.' Takingϑ as the natural level of pollution absorption, we can assume that the total level of pollution follows this dynamic:
is the probability that an individual dies before the end of the second period of his life under the harmful effects of GHG, such as scorching heat. What is more, on a national plan, growing statistics about this heat wave and mortality rate among the old generation could urge the Public Authority to react, and invest in environmental maintenance.
( ) E
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Behavior of Other Institutional Components of the Model
Households
The general characteristics concerning the life cycle of the agents remain identical as above. The representative consumer in a cohort maximizes his/her preferences which are expressed across the inter-temporal utility function below. This is written with a separable consumption function over the two periods and within a parameter ( ) The following function given below allows us to estimate households' utility:
[37] 
Where the Discounted Life Cycle Income ( ) 
a. New Government Budget
With the assumption of green taxes financing environmental maintenance and/or an international solidarity fund, as well as the avoidance of ecological debt, the budget of the Public Authority becomes: [44] ( ) 
Environmental Maintenance
Public Authority environmental policies set during each period have a direct effect on the parameter
, which increases or decreases the utility of agents, as the maintenance improves the quality of the environment. When this maintenance is realized at an optimal level, due to cumulative positive effects, environmental quality is better than during the current and next period 1 t + .
Assuming a constant level of emissions, the quality of the environment during period t+1 ii is bequeathed to the following generation, hence the positive intergenerational effect is emphasized. Therefore, logically, future young generations who will enter in the
Proposition 5
If the emission quota which is equal to the level of property rights, and GHG emissions assigned by the Supranational Committee are enforced, such that all the optimum relations presented above hold, the tax rate for achieving these policies will be the optimal one.
Dynamics of Capital Accumulation in the OLG model with an Environment and Market Equilibrium Summary
Capital Accumulation
As in Diamond's model, the total savings of the young generation are their savings S 1 in the economy and will be the stock of capital of the period t+1. So: 
The savings of the agents living and working in each period t is: 
One can note that this expression increases with Discounted Life Cycle Income ( t RiCVi ) and a nondecreasing interest rate.
Markets Equilibrium Summary
The general equilibrium of the different markets is thus determined as follows:
a. Labor Market
The active population is equal to the number of young members in a cohort at each period t. So:
The quantity of permits on offer, on the basis of attributed charges, is equal to the number of permits required by the companies:
. Market of Goods and Services
As we are in a closed economy, the supply and the demand equilibrium on this market is verified when:
[49]
we we we we t t t t
Walras's law asserts that when considering any particular market, if all other markets in an economy are in equilibrium, then that specific market must also be in equilibrium. As a consequence, this principle leads us to consider that equilibrium is achieved on the capital market.
Furthermore, we assume as in Schubert (2000) that at the initial period of the economy or in the one preceding the current period t, there were pre-existing savings which financed the initial stock of capital ( ). Following this, the savings of the young generation will finance the stock of capital for investment in the economy, so that at each period t we can have the equilibrium relationships 
Intertemporal Capital Equilibrium
In this section the growth path is characterized within the environmental policy instrument. 
Given the dynamic written above, with relation [28], we have: 
Some Analyses in a Steady State
The Dynamic Equilibrium
Looking again at capital accumulation in the economy, it is possible to express it as a function of the variables and parameters. 
− a general form which was roughly characterized by Diamond's 14 steady state, allowing a level of capital to be the solution to the above equation.
About the Nature of the Steady State
We can establish the relationship: 
As well as:
[62] This result leads to the conclusion that the assumption concerning the initial allocation of tradable emission permits is unchecked in the case of Galor et al. (1989) within the framework of overlapping generations models.
Stability or Instability of the Stationary State
We have before us a case of a 3-factor model, with two stock-variables. Looking again at equation [54] 
